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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

LAND OCCUPIER LIABILITY IN WASHINGTON
The rules of law governing the liability of an occupier of land to
persons entering thereon were developed in England in the 19th
century.' Most commentators have concluded that they were based
on a quid pro quo rationale, the degree of care owing to an entrant
by an occupier increasing as a function of the degree of benefit, real
or potential, accruing to the occupier by reason of the entrance.'
In order to facilitate application of the rules, the categories of trespasser, licensee, and invitee were used, occupiers owing a predetermined degree of care to persons in each category.3 Onice an entrant
was properly categorized, determining whether there was liability became a matter of "mechanical jurisprudence."4 Although modified
in varying degrees, these rules remain the touchstone for determining
land occupier liability in Washington as well as other American jurisdictions.5 Recent developments in the law of land occupier liability
render appropriate a survey of the present rules in Washington.
I. DUTY TO TRESPASSING ADULTS

In Washington a trespasser is one who enters another's land without
express or implied permission.6 The occupier of Washington land
owes an adult trespasser a duty only to refrain from willfully and
7
wantonly injuring him.
The Washington Supreme Court has defined willful misconduct as
an act involving knowledge of peril coupled with a conscious failure
to avert injury." Wanton misconduct is an intentional act or omission
12 F.

HARPER

& F. JAmms, TORTS 1430 (1956)

[hereinafter cited as

HARPER &

JAmEs]; Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Tres-

passers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182 (1953); James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land:
Dities owed to Trespassers,63 YALE L.J. 144 (1953).
1W. PROSSER, TORTS 396 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER] ; HARPER &
JAMMs 1430; Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort. 21 MIcH. L. REv. 495, 504 (1923) ; Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligationsin, the Law of Tort, 53 U. PA. L. REv. 209, 220 (1905).
PROSSER 364; HARPER & JaIms 1430; Green, Landowner v. Intruder; intruder
v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MicH L. Rsv. 495, 503 (1923).
"Comment, Liability of Landlord and Tenant to Persons Injured on the Premises,
39 WASH. L. REv. 345 (1964).
' PROSSR 364; HARPER & JAIEs 1430.

'Winter

v. Mackner, 68 Wn. 2d 943, 945, 416 P.2d 453, 454 (1966), citing

Schock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn. 2d 599,

1057 P.2d 838 (1940).
Id.; Mail v. Smith Lumber & Shingle Co., 47 Wn. 2d 447, 449, 287 P.2d 877, 878
(1955); Schock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn.
2d 599, 606, 105 P.2d 838, 842 (1940).
'Adkisson v. Seattle, 42 Wn. 2d 676, 684, 258 P.2d 461, 466 (1953).
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with reckless disregard for consequences with knowledge that there
is a high probability of substantial injury to someone.' The essence
of willfulness is intent to injure, whereas wantonness implies indifference as to whether an injury will occur.1" Digging a trench and
leaving dirt piled in a city street without warning signs, barricades,
or lights is wanton misconduct."x Causing a four-foot excavation to
be made adjacent to a frequently used path from an apartment to
garbage cans and failing to erect barricades or warnings is also wanton
misconduct.12 But leaving a large rock at the edge of an infrequently
used parking area after tearing down a nearby rock wall is not wanton
misconduct." The results follow from an application of the classic
balancing test in which the probability of occurrence of the event is
balanced aginst the gravity of the resulting injury." Because the pile
of dirt and the excavation were both located on or adjacent to regularly
traveled routes, there was a high probability that someone would be
injured. And if an injury were to occur, it would probably be serious.
On the other hand, the rock was not located on or adjacent to a regularly traveled route and, therefore, the probability of injury was low.
Moreover, if any injury were to occur, it would probably not be
serious.
90Id. at 687, 258 P.2d at 467.
1 Id. at 684, 258 P.2d at 466 (citing 38 Am. JUR. Negligence § 48). The Washington definition of willfullness denotes a state of culpability akin to that of "knowingly"
in the Model Penal Code, and the definition of wantonness corresponds closely to
"recklessness" in the Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
"Adkisson v. Seattle, 42 Wn. 2d 676, 258, P.2d 461 (1953). It should be noted
that this case involved a municipality's liability for the condition of a public street,
where the traditional categories of entrants are not applicable. See, e.g., Owens v.
Seattle, 49 Wn. 2d 187, 299 P.2d 560 (1956), noted in 61 A.L.R. 2d 417. However
the court has held that the same definition is applicable in cases where the injury
was incurred on private property. Greetan v. Solomon, 47 Wn. 2d 354, 287 P.2d 721
(1955).
" Greetan v. Solomon, 47 Wn. 2d 354, 287 P.2d 721 (1955). In this case plaintiff
had been visiting friends who were tenants in defendant's apartment house. The
plaintiff was merely a licensee as to her hosts, whereas she was an invitee vis-i-vis
the landlord. See Comment, Liability of Landlord and Tenant to Persons Injured on
the Premises, 39 WASI. L. REv. 345 (1964). The trial court's finding of wantonness
was necessary to recovery since it also found that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent, thus precluding recovery on a theory of negligence. The Washington
Supreme Court affirmed the wantonness holding and therefore found it unnecessary
to consider the negligence-contributory negligence issue.
"3Benson v. South Kitsap School Dist., 63 Wn. 2d 192, 386 P.2d 137 (1963).
" The principal exponent of this balancing approach was Judge Learned Hand.
His formula contained three factors: 1) the probability of occurrence of the event;
2) the gravity of harm should the event take place; and 3) the burden on the defendant of taking adequate precaution to prevent the occurrence. See, e.g., United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In none of the three cases discussed above was the burden of correcting the hazardous situation of sufficient magnitude to be determinative of the issue of liability.

1968]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

There have been no Washington appellate decisions turning on
willful misconduct toward trespassers. Spring gun cases present the
classic example of willful misconduct toward trespassers. 15 Since
Washington cases on the subject involved criminal prosecution of the
occupiers,'" Washington has not explicitly considered the rules of
land occupier liability in such circumstances. There seems little doubt,
however, that if presented with the issue, the Washington Supreme
Court would award damages for injuries suffered by a trespasser
caused by an occupier's willful misconduct.17
The Restatement (Second) and some courts in other jurisdictions
have ameliorated the strict willful and wanton rule by adopting exceptions to it in three circumstances. First, an occupier is held to a
duty of reasonable care when he engages in a dangerous activity in
a limited area upon which he knows or should know persons regularly
trespass.' Second, an occupier who has created highly dangerous
conditions in a limited area on his land must exercise reasonable care
to warn trespassers if he knows or should know that-intrusions occur
regularly in that limited area and that the trespassers are not likely
to discover the conditions.' 9 Third, an occupier of land is held to a
duty of reasonable care toward a trespasser of whose presence he
knows or should have known.2 ° The imposition of these exceptions
appears to be an attempt to infuse a notion of reasonableness into the
traditional rule of no liability.
The Washington court has apparently not had occasion to consider
the "discovered trespasser" exception, and has rejected the exception
where the occupier carries on a dangerous activity in a limited area
" See Bohlen and Burns, The Privilege to Protect Property By Dangerous Bar-

riers
and Mechanical Devices, 35 YALPa L.J. 525 (1926).
"0 See, e.g., State v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 39 P. 1080 (1895).
' The rule has historically been stated in terms of willful or wanton conduct,
and the court has shown no hesitancy to impose liability in cases in which it
found wanton conduct. See Greetan v. Solomon, 47 Wn. 2d 354, 287 P.2d 721
(1955). It follows a fortiori that liability would be imposed upon a defendant
who had willfully injured a plaintiff, since a higher degree of culpability is
involved in willfulness than in wantonness. See note 10, supra.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §334 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT (SECOaND)]; Lyshak v. Detroit, 351 Mich. 230, 88 N.W. 2d 596
(1958); Cater v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 114 S.C. 517, 104 S.E. 186 (1920);
Cheslock v. Pittsburgh P. Co., 363 Pa. 157, 69 A.2d 108 (1949).
12 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) §335; Savoie v. Littleton Construction Co., 95
N.H. 67, 57 A.2d 772 (1948); Mix v. Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 389, 18 N.W. 2d
130 (1945).
:2 RESTATEIENT (SECOND) §336; Lyshak v. Detroit, 351 Mich. 230, 88 N.W.2d
596 (1958); Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries, 98 Cal. App. 2d 91, 219 P.2d 73
(1950); Kennedy v. Southern Pa. Traction Co., 333 Pa. 406, 3 A.2d 395 (1939).
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upon which persons regularly trespass.21 Two early Washington cases
involving high voltage power lines seemed to establish an exception
to the willful and wanton rule where "dangerous instrumentalities"
were involved.22 However, later trespasser cases involving power lines
retreated from this position.23 It thus appears that the Washington
court will deny relief to an injured adult trespasser unless his injury
is caused by an occupier's willful and wanton conduct.
II.

DUTY TO TRESPASSING CHILDREN

When the injured trespasser is a child, courts have much more readily imposed liability on the occupier. Washington and a majority of
other American jurisdictions apply the attractive nuisance doctrine in
addition to the willful and wanton rule.2" When applicable, the attractive nuisance doctrine imposes a duty of reasonable care on the occupier toward children, in effect raising them to the status of invitees.25
Washington specifies five requirements for recovery under the attractive nuisance doctrine: 26 (1) the injury must have been caused by a
dangerous instrumentality or condition; (2) that instrumentality or
condition must have allured or enticed the child onto the premises; (3)
the instrumentality or condition must be of such a nature that the child
did not appreciate the hazard; (4) the instrumentality or condition
must be unguarded and near a place at which it is reasonable to expect
that young children will be present; and (5) access to the instrumental-'Hiatt v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 138 Wash. 558. 244 P. 994 (1926). Here a
railroad engine made a "flying switch" at night in an area where persons frequently crossed the railroad tracks; held-no recovery unless the act could be
characterized as willful and wanton.
-Talkington v. Washington Water Power Co., 96 Wash. 386, 165 P. 87 (1917);
Clark v. Longview Public Service Co., 143 Wash. 319, 255 P. 380 (1927)
'Hanson
v. Washington Water Power Co., 165 Wash. 497, 5 P.2d 1025
(1931); Kedziora v. Washington Water Power Co., 193 Wash. 51, 74 P.2d 898
(1937); Deffland v. Spokane Portland Cement Co., 26 Wn. 2d 891, 176 P.2d 311
(1947).
"Schock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn. 2d
599, 105 P.2d 838 (1940). The doctrine is commonly spoken of as applying to
children who are trespassers, but it should apply a fortiori to children who are
licensees. See Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427 (1959);
Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowzner. Basis of Responsibility
in

Tort, 21

MICH-.

L.

REv. 495

(1923);

L.

ELDREDGE,

MODER,,

TORT

PROBLEMAS

189-204 (1941) ; HARPER & JA-ES 1447-61. The doctrine was apparently first
applied in Sioux City & Pacific R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873),
a "turntable case."
'See
HARPER & JAMES 1448; Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV.
427, 429 (1959) ; Comment, The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine in W,ashington,
22 WASH. L. REV. 45, 46-47 (1947)

; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

§ 339.

" Schock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn.
2d 599, 616, 105 P.2d 838, 846 (1940). The most recent case to apply the doctrine
is Mathis v. Swanson, 68 Wn. 2d 424, 413 P.2d 662 (1966).
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ity or condition could reasonably have been prevented by the occupier.
The dangerous instrumentality or condition mentioned in the first
requirement does not include "simple tools and appliances used in
the ordinary conduct of business" such as a pike pole used for moving logs in a mill pond." Neither does it include a heavy skiff leaning against a wall.2 8 It may include a steel I-beam lying on its flange 29
and a smoldering fire partially covered by dirt.30
The requirement of allurement or enticement by the instrumentality
or condition has been rejected by a majority of jurisdictions and the
Restatement (Second).31 Washington, however, has retained the allurement requirement, 2 although the court has been less than consistent in applying it. In one case the court reversed a summary
judgment holding a land occupier not liable to a trespassing thirteenyear-old boy injured when a steel I-beam lying on its flange tipped
over.3 3 But in an earlier case the court affirmed a judgment of dismissal holding an occupier not liable to a trespassing five-year-old
boy injured when a skiff leaning against a wall fell on him.3' The
requirement of allurement was, at first blush, satisfied in both cases
because the instrumentality was visible and accessible from a public
way. 35 A smouldering fire partially covered with dirt giving an appearance of smoke rising from the ground is also deemed capable of
alluring or enticing young children."
=Mail v. Smith Lumber Co., 47 Wn. 2d 447, 449-50, 287 P.2d 877, 878 (1955).
" Holland v. Niemi, 55 Wn.2d 85, 345 P.2d 1106 (1959).
Mathis v. Swanson, 68 Wn. 2d 424, 413 P.2d 662 (1966).
Brannon v. Harmon, 56 Wn. 2d 826, 355 P.2d 792 (1960).
32
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 339, comment e at 200; PROSSER 375; HRPER
& JAMS 1450-51.

'Sherman v. Seattle, 57 Wn.2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960). The minority view
is apparently based on the now discredited case of United Zinc & Chemical Co. v.
Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922). It is generally conceded that Britt was overruled
sub silento by Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411 (1934). See Prosser,
Trespassing Children, 47 CAsIa. L. REv. 427, 431 (1959).
'Mathis v. Swanson, 68 Wn. 2d 424, 413 P.2d 662 (1966). The lower court's
granting of a motion for summary judgment was tantamount to a holding that as
a matter of law the attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply to the facts of the
case. By its reversal of this judgment the supreme court held that the minds of
reasonable men might differ as to whether or not the doctrine was applicable.
" Holland v. Niemi, 55 Wn. 2d 85, 345 P.2d 1106 (1959). By so affirming the
court held that as a matter of law the attractive nuisance doctrine was not applicable to the facts of the case.
'The Mathis court distinguished Holland on the ground that the Mathis
I-beam was near a public sidewalk and therefore the presence of children was
reasonably foreseeable. Seemingly overlooked was the fact that the Holland skiff
was near an alley in which children frequently played. A skiff leaning against a
wall would seem to a child to be an adequate hiding place or playhouse just as
much as an I-beam would seem to present an interesting tight-rope problem.
'Brannon v. Harmon, 56 Wn.2d 826, 355 P.2d 792 (1960)
(reversing a summary judgment for the land occupier-defendant).
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A fifteen-year-old boy of normal intelligence is too old as a matter
of law to recover under the attractive nuisance doctrine.3 7 He is old
enough to appreciate most hazards. A thirteen-year-old boy, on the
other hand, is not as a matter of law too old to recover under the
doctrine. 3' The doctrine is not applied to conditions the dangerousness
of which is apparent to the injured child, such as open fires 39 and
4
open waterways. 1
The requirement that the instrumentality or condition be left unguarded is straightforward. And no case could be found which turned
on the fifth consideration, the reasonableness of the burden on the
occupier of preventing trespassing children from being exposed to
dangers on his land. The court has discussed neither requirement at
any length.
The Washington court has not restricted itself to application of
the attractive nuisance doctrine as the only method of granting relief
to injured trespassing children. In Sherman v. Seattle4' a three-yearold boy was injured when he was run over by a rail lift operated by
the defendant. The court held that the attractive nuisance doctrine did
not apply since the lift had not enticed the boy to be where he was,
but nevertheless imposed liability on the defendant. The finding of
liability was predicated on the child's presence on the lift site being
reasonably foreseeable because of the site's proximity to a place
where children were likely to be present. The court also emphasized the fact that the plaintiff had been injured by an activity of
the occupant rather than by an existing condition on the premises.
By engaging in a potentially harmful activity near where children
are known to play the occupier is deemed to have more reason to
foresee the possible harmful consequences. It thus appears that in
Washington an occupant carrying on an activity near where children
4 2
are likely to play owes a duty of reasonable care for their safety.
Hanson v. Freigang, 55 Wn. 2d 70, 345 P.2d 1109 (1959).
Mathis v. Swanson, 68 Wn. 2d 424, 413 P.2d 662 (1966).
" Clark v. Bremerton, 1 Wn. 2d 689, 97 P.2d 112 (1939).
"Meyer v. General Electric Co., 46 Wn. 2d 251, 280 P.2d 257 (1955).
" 57 Wn. 2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960). See also Helland v. Arland, 14 Wn. 2d
32, 126 P.2d 594 (1942), in which the court held that a milk truck driver owed
.7

'

a duty of reasonable care to a five-year-old trespasser on his delivery truck, since
"a child as young as [the decedent] can [not] be in any real sense a trespasser."

Id. at 34, 126 P.2d at 595.

12In Sherman the court also emphasized the unique circumstance involved in
the case that the entire area was under control of the defendant city and the

plaintiff resided with his family on the premises.

This fact was not determin-

ative of the issue of liability, however, and probably was relevant only to the
foreseeability of the child's presence at the lift site. Properly read, therefore, the
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This exception is apparently an application of the Restatement (Second) position, limited, however, to cases involving trespassing children.43
The rule governing the liability of a land occupier to a trespassing
child in Washington thus appears to generally impose a duty of refraining from willfully and wantonly injuring the child, modified by
the attractive nuisance doctrine with respect to conditions or instrumentalities and the Sherman rule with respect to activities.

III. DUTY TO LICENSEES
A licensee in Washington is one who has either express or implied
permission to enter an occupier's land. 44 The Washington court is
apparently in agreement with the Restatement (Second) regarding
the kinds of entrants which fall within this category 5 Thus, a woman
visiting in a hotel operated by her mother, 46 a social guest at a person's residence, 47 and a grandmother caring for her grandchildren in
her daughter's home, 48 are all licensees.
The duty owed by an occupier to a licensee is generally only to
refrain from willfully and wantonly injuring him.49 Despite dicta to
Case is not an aberration, but rather is solid precedent for an expanded duty of
an occupier to children.
"2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §336 is a codification of the "discovered trespasser" exception which imposes a duty of reasonable care upon an occupier who
knows or should know of the presence of a trespasser. See note 20, supra. The
Sherman rule appears to be an application of this section to situations involving
trespassing children, imposing a duty of reasonable care on an occupier who
engages in activities near where children play. In light of the natural curiosity
of children one can reasonably foresee their venturing onto nearby premises for
the purposes of investigation. See also note 18 and accompanying text, supra.
" Steele v. Thorne, 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 708, 710, 435 P.2d 544, 545 (1967);
Schock v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, 5 Wn. 2d 599,
605, 105 P.2d 838, 841 (1940).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §330, comment h at 175 states that the category
of licensee includes three types of persons: (1) those who are on the land of
another solely for the entrant's own purposes, and only by the express or implied
consent of the occupier; (2) members of the occupier's household; and (3) social
guests. The Washington court has quoted this passage with approval, most recently
in Steele v. Thorne, 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 708, 710-11; 435 P.2d 544, 545 (1967). It
is interesting to note the extent to which the Washington court has stretched the
concept of "members of the household." It has been held to include the mother of
a married daughter, even though the mother resided elsewhere and was only visiting the daughter, Lucas v. Barner, 56 Wn. 2d 136, 351 P.2d 492 (1960), and the
married daughter of a mother, even though the daughter resided elsewhere and
was only visiting the mother, Steele v. Thorne, 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 708, 435 P.2d
544 (1967).
" Steele v. Thorne, 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 708, 435 P.2d 544 (1967).
'7 Dotson v. Haddock, 46 Wn. 2d 52, 278 P.2d 338 (1955).
"'Lucas v. Barner, 56 Wn. 2d 136, 351 P.2d 492 (1960). See also Porter v.
Ferguson, 53 Wn. 2d 693, 336 P.2d 133 (1959).
"Steele v. Thorne, 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 708, 711, 435 P.2d 544, 546 (1967);
McNamara v. Hall, 38 Wn. 2d 864, 867, 233 P.2d 852 (1951); Garner v. Pacific
Coast Coal Co., 3 Wn. 2d 143, 150, 100 P.2d 32, 35 (1940).
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the contrary in some earlier cases," the Washington court strictly
applied the willful and wanton rule toward licensees until Potts v.
Amis.5" In Potts the court drew a distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance and found liability where a social guest was injured
by active conduct of the occupier which was admittedly negligent, but
which fell short of being willful and wanton.5 2 In thus imposing
liability the court established an exception to the willful and wanton
rule by holding an occupier engaged in active conduct to a duty of
53
reasonable care toward a licensee of whose presence he is aware.
Another exception to the willful and wanton rule was established
in Miniken v. Carr.54 In Miniken the entrant was injured when she
fell down a flight of stairs behind one of two adjacent unmarked
doors while looking for a restroom. By imposing liability on the
occupier, the court established a duty on the part of the land occupier
to warn licensees of "concealed, dangerous conditions" of which the
occupier knows or should know.
A third exception to the willful and wanton rule, closely related
to the "concealed, dangerous condition" exception of Miniken, was
included as one of three alternative holdings in Ward v. Thornpson25
In Ward the plaintiff was injured when scaffolding upon which he
was standing collapsed. After concluding that the entrant could be
characterized as an invitee under either the economic benefit test or
invitation test, the court went on to assert that even if the plaintiff
were a licensee the occupier owed him a duty to maintain the scaffolding in a safe condition since it was a "dangerous condition or
' Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 16 Wn. 2d 424, 432, 133 P.2d 797,
800 (1943); Clark v. Longview Pub. Service Co., 143 Wash. 319, 323, 255 P. 380,
381 (1927).
"'62 Wn. 2d 777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963), noted in 39 WASH. L. REv. 345 (1964).
12The
occupier struck the plaintiff with a golf club while demonstrating the
proper swing. Id. at 778, 384 P.2d at 826.
' Cf. the "discovered trespasser" rule mentioned in the text accompanying
note 20 supra. And cf. Sherman v. Seattle, 57 Wn. 2d 233, 356 P.2d 316 (1960),
discussed in text accompanying notes 41-43, supra.
'71 Wash. Dec. 2d 317, 428 P.2d 716 (1967). Although the court recognized
that the plaintiff could conceivably have been characterized as an invitee at the
time of the accident and the defendant would therefore have had a duty to at least
warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condition, there was no assurance that liability
was imposed at trial on that theory alone. In affirming the lower court's finding of
liability the court was cognizant of the possibility that liability had been predicated on the concealed, dangerous condition exception to the normal duty owed
by an occupier to a licensee. The language and holding of the court explicitly
incorporates this latter theory.
'57 Wn. 2d 655, 359 P.2d 143 (1961), noted in 37 WASH L. REv. 250 (1962).
This exception to the general rule was approved in Haugen v. Central Lutheran
Church, 58 Wn. 2d 166, 361 P.2d 637 (1961).
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instrumentality."5 By thus imposing liability the court established a
duty on the part of a land occupier to maintain dangerous instrumentalities on his premises in a safe condition if a licensee might otherwise be injured thereby.
In Washington a land occupier thus owes a licensee a duty only to
refrain from willfully and wantonly injuring him unless (1) a dangerous activity, (2) a concealed dangerous condition, or (3) a dangerous
instrumentality is involved, in which case the occupier owes the licensee a duty of reasonable care. Washington therefore appears to
have gone somewhat beyond the Restatement (Second) rule governing the land occupier's liability to a licenseeST
IV. DUTY TO INVITEES
In Washington an invitee is either an entrant whose visit involves
actual or potential pecuniary benefit to the occupier, or one who has
responded to a public invitation which expressly or impliedly represents that reasonable care has been taken for persons so entering., 8
With the recent addition of the latter test the Washington rule is
now in agreement with that of the Restatement (Second) and the
majority of other jurisdictions. 59
r'Ward v. Thompson, 57 Wn. 2d 655, 659-60, 359 P.2d 143, 145 (1961). The
court stated that such a duty is demanded by public policy and could not be avoided "on
the basis of time-worn distinctions between licensees and invitees." Id. at 660, 359 P.2d
at 145.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 341 deals with activities of the occupier which
may be dangerous to the licensee, and 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) § 342 deals with
dangerous conditions on the premises. Comment d to § 342 states:
[a] possessor of land owes to a licensee no duty to prepare a safe place for
the licensee's reception or to inspect the land to discover possible or even
probable dangers.
The Ward rule apparently imposes a higher duty of care by requiring the occupier
to maintain an instrumentality in a safe condition. Proper maintenance would
require both inspection and affirmative steps to make the instrumentality safe.
'McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 68 Wa 2d 644, 414 P.2d
773 (1966), noted in 42 WASH. L. REv. 299 (1966).
1 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) § 332; HARPER & JAMES 1478; PROSSER 399. Undoubtedly in response to McKinnon the 1967 state legislature passed the so-called
Timber Baron Statute, which limits the liability of landowners who permit their
land to be used for recreational purposes by members of the public. Section 2 of
the Act provides that:
[a]ny landowner who allows members of the public to use his agricultural
or forest land for the purposes of outdoor recreation, which term includes
hunting, fishing, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study,
winter sports, viewing or enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites, without charging a fee of any kind therefor, shall not be liable for
unintentional injuries to such users: PROVIDED, That nothing in this section shall prevent the liability of such a landowner for injuries sustained to
users by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which
warning signs have not been conspicuously posted; PROVIDED FURTHER,
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Toward an invitee the occupier owes a duty to use ordinary care
to keep the premises upon which the entrant is invited safe for the
purpose of the invitation."° This duty includes an inspection of the
premises to discover any dangerous conditions which are not readily
apparent.6 Once a dangerous condition has been discovered by the
occupier, however, it is unclear whether he can discharge his duty
by merely warning the invitee of the condition, or whether he must
take affirmative steps to remove the dangerous condition. The Restatement (Second) position is that a warning would normally be
sufficient,62 but this position has been the object of much criticism.6
Washington has not taken a position on the question.
V.

SUMMARY

Since 1960 the Washington Supreme Court has gradually wrought
a reformation in Washington land occupier liability law. The willful
and wanton rule governing liability to licensees has been modified by
Ward v. Thompson,64 in which the occupier was held to have a duty
to maintain dangerous instrumentalities in a safe condition for the
licensee; by Potts v. Amis,6" in which the occupier was held to have
a duty to refrain from active conduct which might endanger the
licensee; and by Miniken v. Carr,6 in which the occupier was held
to have a duty to warn the licensee of concealed, dangerous conditions.
The rule governing liability to invitees has been modified by McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,67 which broadened the
category of invitee to include persons responding to a public invitation."8 Since no trespasser case has reached the court in recent times
it is impossible to ascertain with much certainty whether the court's
That nothing in this act limits or expands in any way the doctrine of attractive nuisance.
Ch. 216, §2, [1967] Wash. Sess. Laws 1416.
'McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 68 Wn. 2d 644, 414 P.2d
733 (1966); Phelps v. Wescott, 68 Wn. 2d 11, 410 P.2d 611 (1966); Buttnick v.
J. & M. Inc., 186 Wash. 658, 59 P.2d 750 (1936).
" The duty of inspection is one of the basic differences between the duties owed
by an occupier to invitees and those owed licensees. However, there may be no such
difference when dangerous instrumentalities and licenses are involved. See note 57,
supra. See also HARPER & JAMES 1487-88.
022 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 343, comment b at 216 and comment d at 217.
See, e.g., HARPER & JAMES 1489-96.
See discussion accompanying note 55, supra.
'See discussion accompanying note 51, supra.
' See discussion accompanying note 54, supra.
'See note, 58, supra.
' From these cases one can discern the basic pattern of evolution in this area of
Washington law. Two phases are involved. First there is a gradual increase in the
degree of care owed to licensees through the adoption of exceptions to the willful and
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reform will extend to this area of law. The holding in Sherman v.
Seattle"9 suggests an affirmative answer to this question.
The Washington court has not made clear the extent to which it
is willing to reform land occupier liability law, but to date it seems
to be satisfied with bringing Washington law into accord with the
rules advocated by the Restatement (Second). This would mean a
retention of the trespasser-licensee-invitee categorization, an approach
which has been condemned by an increasing number of commentators.
Dean Prosser has been critical of the licensee-invitee distinction,
but has not advocated complete abandonment of the traditional approach.7 ° Professor Harper has advocated de-emphasis of the licenseeinvitee distinction and in its stead a determination of liability based
on the reasonable expectations of the entrant and "all the other
pertinent facts of the case."'

Professor James has expressed his

disapproval, arguing that fictions of "invitation" and "permission"
tend to obscure the proper basis of liability, which is the occupier's
foreseeability of harm to the entrant.7 2 Other writers have argued
for outright abandonment of the distinction between licensees and
invitees.7 3
It is true that application of the Restatement (Second) rules would
result in fewer negligent land occupiers escaping liability to injured
entrants in Washington. For this reason a move toward the adoption
wanton rule. Second, as the degree of care owed by the occupier approaches that
owed to invitees, the invitee category is broadened by assimilation of that portion
of the licensee category to which the higher degree of care is applicable.
See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
0
See Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MiNw. L. Rav. 573 (1942), in
which the author argued for a return to the invitee-licensee language rather than the
First Restatement's business visitor notion advocated by Professor Bohlen, the First
Restatement's reporter. Prosser's thesis is that the traditional distinctions are permissible so long as the determinative factor for imposing liability is the reasonable
expectations of the entrant. See Id. at 612.
7' Harper. Laube v. Stevenson: A Discussion, 25 CoxN.
B.J. 123, 133-34 (1951).
7
"Sce HARPER & JAMES 1430-505.
' See, e.g., Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees,
22 Mo. L. REv. 186 (1957); 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 599 (1958); Marsh, The History and
Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers,69 L.Q. REv. 182, 359 (1953).
Salmond wrote:
The law on the whole subject is still in a confused state. The delimitation
between the different categories is far from settled, nor is it possible to state
with certainty the duties owed to persons falling under those categories. Had it
been earlier and more generally recognized that the topic is only one branch of
the law of negligence it might have been seen that the occupier's duties cannot
conveniently be put into strait jackets to fit the character in which the plaintiff
comes on to the premises, and the law would then have been freed of some needless refinements and profitless distinctions.
J. SALmOND, LAW or ToRTs 471 (10th ed. 1945). Pursuant to a recommendation by
the Law Reform Committee the distinction between licensees and invitees was abrogated by statute in England. Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957).
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of these rules should be applauded.7 4 However it is submitted that
not only does the Restatement (Second) stop short of the most
desirable rules governing land occupier liability, but also that its
method of dealing with land occupier liability law perpetuates a fundamentally undesirable approach to the problem by retaining the traditional categories of entrants and engrafting exceptions onto the traditional limited duties.
Commentators have generally given short shrift to the origin of
the rules governing land occupier liability. They have dismissed the
early English cases and the rules they first announced as anachronistic holdovers from an era and a society which put an inordinate
value on land ownership and use, and which "therefore" generated
special rules for land occupier liability.75 It is suggested that such
an analysis is inaccurate.
Negligence did not gain recognition as an independent basis for
an action in tort until around 1825.76 The rules governing the liability
of an occupier of land to persons entering his premises were first
clearly formulated in an 1866 English case.77 Although the early
decisions espouse no single rationale for the rules, many of them
contain language which suggests that the rules were based at least
in part on notions of negligence, viz., the entrant's reasonable expectations of safety and the occupier's forseeability of harm. 78 And in an
As stated by Professor James,
... the traditional rule confers on an occupier of land a special privilege to be
careless which is quite out of keeping with the development of accident law
generally and is no more justified here than it would be in the case of any other
useful enterprise or activity. HARPER & JAMES 1440.
'See authorities cited in note 2 supra.
" Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. REv. 184,
195 (1926) ; PROSSER 143.
'Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866); aff'd., L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (1867).
In Indermaur v. Dames, Id. at 288 the court said:
... we consider it settled law, that [one who has been invited on the premises
for business purposes] is entitled to expect that the occupier shall ... use reasonable care to prevent damage for unusual danger, [of] which he knows or ought to
know. (emphasis added.)
With respect to licensees the same court said: "One who comes upon another's land
by the owner's permission or invitation has a right to expect that the owner will not
dig a pit thereon... so that persons lawfully coming there may receive injury."
Corby v. Hill, 140 Eng. Rep. 1209, 1213 (C.P. 1858) (emphasis added). Bramwell,
B. in a case also involving a licensee said "...where a person is in the house of
another.., he has a right to expect that the owner of the house will take reasonable
care to protect him from injury." Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195, 1197
(Ex. 1856) (emphasis added). And in a case involving a trespasser who had
wandered far from the highway the court distinguished Corby v. Hill on the basis
of the entrant's expectations. Hounsell v. Smyth, 141 Eng. Rep. 1003, 1008 (C.P.
1860). It was settled law in England that a trespasser who had deviated slightly
from the highway and who encountered a peril such as an excavation could recover
notwithstanding the fact that he was a trespasser. This rule was codified in the
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era in which land ownership occupied an especially high economic
and social status, it is likely that the rules did reflect the then-current
notions of expectations and foreseeability.
Shortly after the formulation of these rules, Western legal thought
became dominated by a spirit of extreme dogmatism which persisted
well into this century. 9 Under the influence of this dogmatic spirit,
application of stare decisis resulted in a judicial failure to adapt the
rules to reflect the increasingly humanitarian aspects of an economically and socially evolving civilization. Today these rules probably
do not accurately reflect the reasonable expectations or foreseeability
of either the occupier or the entrant. Courts (and the Restatement
(Second)) have attempted to make the rules more palatable by engrafting various exceptions onto them. While this process has averted
injustice in many cases, its most obvious effect has been confusion
and uncertainty.
It may be that if the Washington court were to re-examine the
rationale which originally supported the rules governing land occupier
liability, it would conclude that the rules were regarded as only particularizations of general negligence principles applied to the circumstances of land ownership and use. To the extent that the present
Washington rules and those espoused by the Restatement (Second)
reflect a different approach, the court would then be faced with a
choice between the original policies and the current ones. It is submitted that the solutions advanced by nearly all the commentators
better comport to the original intent of the courts which established
the rules in the first instance. A policy of basing land occupier liability
rules on a process of balancing (1) the reasonable expectations of
an entrant with the reasonable expectations of an occupier, and (2)
the seriousness of foreseeable harm with the burden of avoiding that
harm, represents a viable approach in our society as it did in midnineteenth century England. The Washington Supreme Court should
therefore not regard the Restatement (Second) as setting forth the
best possible rules for determining liability. Rather, the court should
consider adopting a different approach to this area of the law. In
this case the best approach, interestingly enough, might well be that
General Highway Act, 5 & 6 Win. 4, c. 50 § 70 (1833), which established a distance
of 25 yards on either side of a carriage way in which the occupier could not make
an unguarded open excavation. The rationale behind both the common law rule and
the statute would appear to be the reasonable expectations of the traveller-trespasser
and the foreseeability of an accident on the part of the occupier.
" 1 R. Pound, JURISPRUDENCE 51-68 (1959) ; J. STONE, SoCIAL DImENSiONS OF LAW

AND JUSTICE 9 (1966).
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adopted by the English courts in the mid-1800's, varied only by a
refusal to adopt rigid, specific rules intended to reach all possible
circumstances.8 0

' Factors which the court should consider in determining liability include the
following: (1) the location of the activity or condition, e.g. proximity to public
ways (see, e.g., text accompanying notes 11 & 12 supra) ; (2) the obviousness of the
hazard, a consideration necessarily involving to some extent the age of the entrant
(see, e.g., text accompanying notes 27-30 supra); (3) the reason for the entrant's
presence (e.g., a burglar should not be entitled to expect the same safety precautions
as a doctor on a house call); (4) the utility of the activity or condition to the
occupier and to the public generally (see, e.g., note 59 supra) ; (5) the burden on the
occupier of reducing the probability of injury to the entrant (e.g., by erecting fences
or posting warning signs; and (6) the severity of injury which is likely to be
incurred by the entrant.

